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SOME MATTERS OF PRACTICE
A heavy responsibility rests upon the young and inexperienced lawyer. The client who has suffered from his
incompetence is not likely to be placated by the thought
that practice makes perfect, and the courts apply to the
lawyer ets well 'as to the layman, but with a teasing tenderness, it would seem, the rule that ignorance of the law
is no excuse.
In Enterline v. Miller, 27 Supr. 463, where an attorrey directed subsequent steps in execution upon a levy not
niade until after the return day of the writ, the court said:
"An attorney is not liable to his client for a failure to succeed, resulting in loss to the client, unless this is due to
his mismanagement of the business intrusted to him,
through bad ftalh, inattention or want of professional
skill. Without discussing at length the degree of care and
skill required of an attorney, it is sufficient -for the purposes of the case in hand to say that he must, at least, be
familiar 'with the well-settled principles of law and rules
of practice which are of frequent application in the ordi.
nary business of the profession; must observe the utmost
good faith toward his client; and must give such attention
to his duties, and to the interests of his client, as ordinary
prudence demands, or members of the profession usually

234

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

bestow. For loss to his client, resulting from the lack of
this measure of professional duty and attainments, he must
be held liable; and such loss forms an equitable defense to
his demand for compensation." Justifying a further quotation from the opinion in this case because it presents
the matter in a concrete and ominous form to the student,"Tested by this standard, there was an obvious lack of
professional skill and care on the part of the defendant
(attorney), in the proceedings for the collection of the
Wolfgang claims. An attorney must be held to know the
return day of process issued by his direction, must keep
himself informed of the steps taken by the sheriff in its
execution, and must give all instructions necessary to secure his elient's interests. It is usual for the attorney, on
execution process, to give directions respecting the property which he desires should ,be sold, especially when this
is real estate; and, if he omits this, he should, at least, ascertain what has been done in the premises by the sheriff,
and act as -the interest of his client requires. He must be
held to know that when the return day of -a fi. fa. has
passed without a levy, the writ is functus officio; that a
vend. ex. is issued only for a sale by virtue ofa levy made
on an antecedent writ; land he must at all times inform
himself of the state of the record, and of the sheriff's proceedings, before taking any further step -based thereon."
In view of this measure-of responsibility, it is not
surprising that the law student seems to approach the subject of Practice with some misgivings. He feels that he
can take certain liberties with the substantive llaw; that
common sense has some application; but he regards practice as rigid and uncompromising. This mental attitude
may have some justification.
Chief Justice Mitchell,
whose opinions upon questions of practice have alway-.
been lucid and illuminating, has stated that "practice is a
mass of particulars," and -the law student seems to agree
with him. It has been said that procedure is the machinery as distinguished from the product,-in other words,
practice is operating to make effective the substantie
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law. In diagnosing the case and applying the substantive law the lawyer is a physician; in the use of procedure
the laywer is a surgeon, and there is one subject -thatto the
student of law is a major operation, viz., Execution. Closely related to Execution are the subjects of Lien and Exemption and it is proposed to briefly refer to a few phases
of these subjects, not that anything original is to be presented, or the matters considered fully, but simply as memoranda to present or redail to the student the existence of
principles the neglect of which or ignorance as to which
may seriously embarrass him. The writer recalls a case
where a young attorney, who, in the absence of his father,
was to see that the lien of a certain large judgment was
revived, overlooked it. Tearing his hair and waiving frantically his arms he mentioned his predicament to an older
attorney. The older attorney happened to recall that the
debtor had died just before the date of the expiration of
the lien and that this, much to the surprise of the novice,
prolonged the lien. It is needless to say that the young
lawyer almost expired from joy.
LIEN. As a prerequisite to the issuing of execution,
there must be a final judgment, and, as against the objection of the defendant, it must be a "live" lien. A judgment is a lien upon all of the real estate owned by the
defendant in the county of its entry -from the time of its
entry, and continues so for a period of five years. (It
seems to take the student some little time to fix the fact
that a lien on personal property is acquired only by execution followed by levy). To continue this lien beyond the
period of five years as against incumbrancers and purchasers it is necessary to revive the same by scire facias;
but against the defendant it continues indefinitely, tho,
if he objects, a scire facias quare executionem non must
issue and be reduced to judgment in order to have exe.:ution against his real estate. As to his personal property,
execution can be had after the period of five years by issuing simultaneously with the fieri facias a scire facias.
Act May 19, 1887, P. L. 132. If the defendant does not
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oppose the issuing of execution after the five years, this
is an irregularity not fatal, as to which other credil;ors
cannot object. Sherrard v. Johnston, 193 Pa. 166; Bailey
v. Wagoner, 17 S. & R. 327. At common law, execution
must have been sued out within a year and a day after t-h.
judgment was entered, Bohan v. Reap, 7 Supr. 167 (163),
as it was supposed that within that time the judgment
would have been paid; after that period had elapsed, a
scire facias post annum et diem was necessary and jadgment recovered thereon before execution could issue. Were
the primary object of securing a judgment at the present
time the issuing of execution, it might be accomplished,
in spite of the alleged law's delay, within a year and a
day; but since, at present, a judgment is a most convenient.
and satisfactory form of security for a loan, the majority
of them being entered by confession, there is no good reason 'why the lien of a judgment should rot, instead of continuing for but five years, continue indefinitely, as does
the lien of a mortgage, as against all persons, without revival, except, perhaps, that it would make searches more
burdensome and materially decrease the fees involved.
Mahy an impecunious and unsophisticated borrower ha-,
become pale when, after years of saving to satisfy. a soalt
but patient judgment, he is faced with costs of revival
amounting to twenty dollars or more. Ignorance of the
law is no excuse and is often very painful. A mortgage
is clothed with dignity land maintains at all costs its ancient form, attributes and prerogatives, but in the present
day, it does not scruple to use its poor relative, the judg
ment bond, when it comes to foreclosure. But it is unwise to trifle with tradition.
As to revivals as against a terre tenant the law is
still more arbitrary. The five year period of limitation
begins to run in 'his favor from the time he place. his
deed of record or goes into possession. Wetmore v. Wetmore, 155 Pa. 507. In primitive times, when the land
bound by a judgment was generally located in the immediate vicinity of the domicile of the parties, it was not
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burdensome for the plaintiff to ascertain whether tbere
h.ad been a change of possession, but now, when countl i-,
investments, secured by judgment, are taken upon lands
in distant and remote sections of a county, it is ridiculous
to nfake the security of the same depend upon the plair,tiff's investigation of and knowledge as to a change of
possession 'when no deed -has been placed upon record by a
terre tenant. It is submitted that the law should reauire
a terre tenant to place his deed of record if he is to receive notice of a scire facias.
The Supreme Court, in an effort to find some reason
for the passage of the Act of June 1, 1887, P. L. 289, whicn
nrovides that the terre tenant must be named in the original scire facias,-other than a repeal of the Act of April
16, 1849, P. L. 663, which provides that a lien of a judgment should only commence to run in favor of
a terre tenant from the time he placed his deed of -record,-,said in U'hler v. Moses, 200 Pa. 498, reversing the
Superior Court's holding in 10 Supr. 194, "But, it is asked,
on what does the Act of 1887 operate at all if it does not
operate to repeal the act of 1849? We nswer alm.- in
the express words of the act, it operates to relieve the land
from the lien of the judgment, where the deed to the
terre-tenant has been placed of record, and in the schre
facias to revive, the terre tenant has not been named; and
this is not mere supposition; it is a reasonable infernz e.
It was a common practice to issue a scire facias to revive
judgments against the original debtor, and tat the same
time direct the sheriff to give notice to all terre tenants,
without designating them. Judgments were then often
obtained against tenants for years, or at will, or
they were put to the expense of defending. It was probably the intention of the legislature to put a stop to such an
irregular practice." So -thatthe particular terre tenant, if
any, must be specifically named in the scire facias.
Like the fish and ,game laws, the law of the lien of
the debts of a decedent has been frequently tampered with
by the legislature. At the present writing, a judgment the
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lien of which has died before -the defendant falls in the
class of ordinary debts. "Judgments which were not a
lien on the real estate of the decedent by entry or revi;al,
by due process of law, within five years prior to the d ath
of such decedent, shall not be revived as a lien against r3al
estate by the death of the defendant, but shall rank and
be treated simply as ordinary debts of record, and the len
thereof shall be continued only as provided in section one
hereof." Act of May 3rd, 1909, P. L. 386, Section 2. Nqow
Section 1 has no specific provision relating to the continuance of the lien of a judgment, but provides -thatthe lien of
an ordinary debt may be continued beyond the period of
two years if "an action -forthe recovery thereof be brotght
against the executor," etc. Does this mean that the snire
facias cannot be used ias ithe form of -action and that an
action of debt must be brofight upon the judgment, which
was the common law method of revival? We think ths is
not to be presumed.
While execution cannot be issued, as against real e'its
lien,
has
lost
tate, after the judgment
deon
revival, where the
without
judgment
fendant objects; nor as against personalty without
the simultaneous issuing of a scire facias; the law i. not
the same as to attachment execution. Attachment ex2eution has been held, in this respect, not to be within the
acts governing an ordinary execution. Bohan v. Reap, 7
Supr. 167. Where the defendant in an attachment execution is in the county, he must have notice of the writ, and
has the right to appear and offer any defense that he
could have offered on a scire fiacias to revive. "To reqaire
a previous scire facias to issue-before a writ of attac-.
ment could be taken out, would therefore seem to be suuerfluous, not tending to secure any purpose of justice, but
leading to unnecessary expense and delay. Every object
of a scire facias post annum et diem being provided for in
the writ of attachment itself, it would seem that the provision for that writ must be limited to the case of an ordinary execution issued, in which there is no summons of the
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defendant nor day in court given." Ogilsby v. Lee, 7 W.
& S. 444.
While, as a. general principle, a judgment is a lien only
on the real estate owned by the defendant at the time of
its entry, and to secure a lien on after acquired real
estate judgment on a scire facias is necessary, yet .1here
are several exceptions to this rule. A common law lien
may still -be acquired by execution, but under the Act ."
April 22nd, 1856, P. L. 532, Section 3, the levy must be
entered in the judgment index as notice to any, "purchaser
or mortgagee." "As long ago as the case of Colhoun v.
Snider, 6 Bin., 135, it was held that a pre-existing judgment was not a lien on after acquired real estate, and the
doctrine of this case has been followed without doubt or
hesitation from that time to this. Upon such property an
independent lien may be created by an execution .3sued
from such judgment; but in order to accomplish this ra3ult
it must be accompanied by a levy." Ross & Co.-s and
Elsbree's Appeals, 106 Pa. 82. And this independent lien
can be secured even where the lien of the judgment has
expired before the issuing of execution if the debtor does
Pot object. Sherrard v. Johnston, 193 Pa. 166. It can be
readily seen that this might prove a great advantage to
an insufficiently secured judgment creditor where real estate has been after 'acquired and haste is necessary. In
such cases the lien dates from the time of levy.
Again, a judgment entered against a vendee under
articles of agreement after he has paid but a portion of
the purchase money, binds his whole interest the moment
the legal title is vested in him and forms another exception to the rule as laid down by Justice Yeates, when in
Colhoun v. Snider, 6 Binney 135, in speaking of the lien
of a judgment, he says, "The lien attaches 'at the moment
of entry, and I can have no idea of its shutting at one period and opening at another, so as to embrace, of itself
merely, property not originally bound." Justice Woodward, in Water's Appeal, 35 Pa. 523, expresses the principle as follows: "It has been many times said and de
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cided in Pennsylvania, that a judgment against the equitable estate which a vendee holds under articles of agreement for the sale and purchase of land, attaches to and
binds the legal estate the instant that it vests in the vendee- -In all such cases, effect is given to the judgment lien,
without revival, against a subsequently acquired interest
of the debtor, and it cannot be disguised that, in so far, the
principle that was settled for us, after great deliberation,
in Colhoun v. Snider, 6 Binn. 135, that judgments shall not
bind subsequently acquired real estate, has been qualified,
perhaps contravened."
As a lien creditor can secure a lien on after acquired
property -without the issuance of a scire facias, as appears
above, so he can lose his lien in ways other than the mere
failure to revive within five years. He may release from
the lien of his judgment or mortgage as much of the land.
bound thereby as he sees fit and proceed against the remainder Tor the full amount of his debt, but he cannot ignore the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As
said in iMcIlvain v. The Mutual Assurance Company, 93
Pa. 30, "A mortgagee, for example, may release part or
the whole of the mortgaged premises without inquiring
whether a junior encumbrancer or vendee has intervened.
it is the duty of the latter, if he intends to clraim an equity
through the prior encumbrance, to give the holder notice so
that he may act with his own understandingly; and, if he fail
to do so, the consequences of his neglect must be visited upon
himself. While the law makes it the duty of every man
to so deal with his own as not to injure another unnecessarily, it imposes on the latter a greater obligation to take
care of his own property than it does on a stranger to take
care of it-for him." But where the junior encumbrancer
has given notice to the senior one not to release he disregards it at 'his peril.
Another well established equitable principle is that
pieces of hand subject to* a common incumbrance, when
sold successively, are liable for the incumbrance in the inverse order of alienation.
Consequently, if the holder
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of the incumbrance, with knowledge of the prior sale, re-

leases the pieces last sold, this will, if the pieces released.
are of sufficient value to pay the debt, operate to dis-

charge the lien of the incumbrance on the parts previously sold.

Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 469.

So that, as

set forth in this case, while a junior incumbrancer must
gzve notice of the position of his lien to the prior incumbran6er if he would affect him with notice of his situation, yet knowledge in fact of the position of a purchaser
of land bound by a mortgage is enough, no matter how that
knowledge is acquired. Schrack v. Shriner, 100 Pa. 451
The incidents connected with the acquiring of a lien
over personal property are as varied as the writs by virtue of which a lien may be acquired. A fieri facias effects a lien from the time that it is placed in the hands of
the sheriff. Act of June 16, 1836, sec. 39, P. L. 768. On
first impression it would appear that this was an arbitrary principle too favorable to the judgment creditor as
against the rights of innocent purchasers, but, historically
it is a concession to such purchaser. "At common law a
fieri facias had relation to its teste and bound the defendant's goods from that time, so that if he sold them afterwards, they might still be taken in execution: Rob. Dig.
320. As this often worked great injustice to bona fide
purchasers, the Act of Car. 2, ch. 3, provided, among other
things, that a fieri facias, or other writ of execution,
should bind the property or goods of the person against
whom it issued, only from the time such writ should be
delivered to the officer by whom it was to be executed,
and he was required to indorse, upon the back thereof,
the. day of -themonth and year when he received the same:
Id. 310.
-Our Act of June 16th, 1836, is, in effect, a
transcript of the above, and embraces the same intent, to
wit, the limitation of the lien, of the writ of fieri facias,
as it stood at common law, to the time of its receipt by the
executive officer. The two statutes differ only in this,
that, by the former, the day and year only, when the writ
came to -hand, were to be endorsed; thus leaving the lien
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to cover the whole of the day on which the writ was re-

ceived, whilst the latter requires the endorsement of the
hour also, and, so, limits the lien to the fraction of a day.
The intent of both acts is, however, the same; not to furinsh data for distribution, but to prevent injury to honest
purchasers." Baldwin's Appeal, 86 Pa. 483. It would seem
that if this were the right to be subserved, the act of 1836
should have gone the whole .way and made the lien date
from the time of actual levy. This is the law as to executions issuing from a justice of the peace, the lien thereof
dating from the -time of actual levy. Act of March 28,
1820, sec. 4, 7 Sm. L. 308.
Apparently the "'honest purchaser" was thought more of before a court of inferior
jurisdiction.
Here we have two points established from which the
legislature could choose and they seem to have been quite
impartial in their selection. The lien of an attachment
under the Act of 1869, Fraudulent Debtor's Attachment,
dates from the time that the writ is placed in the hands
of the sheriff, and is, in this respect, like the fi. fa. from the
common pleas. Act of March 17, 1869, sec. 5, P. L. 8.
The writ of foreign attachment effects a lien only from
the time of levy or service, Act of June 13, 1836, sec. 50,
P. L. 580, and the same is true of the writ of attachment
execution, Act of June 16, 1836, sec. 37, P. L. 767; but as
between several writs of foreign attachment or attachicent execution issued upon the same day there is no prior.
ity. It was said in Long's Appeal, 23 Pa. 297, where there
was a contest between eight writs of foreign attachments
issued at different times during the same day and they
vwere allowed to share pro rata,-it not appearing whethe
the court was intimidated by the number issued,-"It is
a principle of the common law, that in judicial and other
public proceedings -there are no fractions of a day, and
that all transactions of the same day are, in general, regarded as occurring at the same instant of time. This
principle has been established 'from necessity and from a
regard to public convenience."
The same principle was
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established as to several writs of attachment execution
issued upon the same day, Baldwin's Appeal, 86 Pa. 483.
But the legislature, not being so impressed with the regard to be paid to public convenience as was the court,
above quoted, in the act relating to fraudulent debtors,
section 5, provided, "In case two or more attachments are
issued against the same party defendant, the one first in
the hands of the proper officer for service shall have the
prior lien, and so on as to other writs issued in pursuance
of this act, in the order of time in which they are issued
to said officer." And, by analogy, it was held that while
there was no priority as between several writs of foreign
attachment issued on the sale day, yet as between an attachment under the act of 1869 and a writ of foreign attachment issued on the same day, priority was given to
the attachment under the act of 1869 as it was first in the
hands of the sheriff and was served first. Underhill v.
Nice, 175 Pa. 39. While the acts providing for the acquiring of lien over personal property are not consistent,
they at least have the element of variety; but it is submitted that were it provided that the lien of all writs should
date from the time of actual levy or service the effect
would be more equitable and the practice less complicated.
DIVESTITURE OF LIEN. The importance of the
subject of divestiture of lien is not to be measured by the
space allotted to it in this article. For an exhaustive discussion of it the reader is referred to The Law of Liens
in Pennsylvania,-Trickett. In this subject we get into
the mathematics of practice and it frequently runs into
big figures.
The writer recalls one case where a purchaser, advised that a mortgage would be discharged by
a judicial sale, when it was not, was called upon to pay in
the neighborhood of $15,000 more than he -had anticipated.
With such possibilities presented, it is not to be wondered
at that the novice approaches the subject with some misgivings.
Certain liens are, in the eyes of the law, looked upon
with special favor, and, in some cases, this ifavored posi-
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tion is sustained by statutory enactment. A "first mortgage" is so protected. Justice Sharswood, in speaking'
of the decision which held that when land, subject to a
mortgage, is sold under a subsequent judgment, the purchaser at sheriff's sale takes it discharged of the lien of
the mortgage, said, in Helfrich v. Weaver, 61 Pa. 385,
"This decision took the profession and the community very
much by surprise, as it was very generally considered
that for all purposes of security and remedy, a mortgage
was what it purported to be, a conveyance of the land.
It was a favored kind of investment, and mortgagees were
alarmed at the probable consequences, as such sales might
take place without notice to them at amounts totally inadequate, and thus their interests be sacrificed." The well
known phraseology of the series of acts of assembly pro
tocting mortgages is retained in the act of May 8, 1901,
P. L. 141, as follows: "When the lien of a mortgage upon
real estate is or shall be prior to all other liens upon the
same property, except other mortgages, ground rents and
purchase money due the commonwealth, and except taxes,
municipal claims and assessments not at the date of said
mortgage duly entered as a lien in the office of the prothonotary of the proper county, and except taxes, municipal claims and assessments, whose lien though afterwards
accruing has by law priority given it, the lien of such mortgage shall not be destroyed or in anywise affected by any
judicial sale or other sale whatsoever," etc.
As to taxes and municipal claims, the Act of May
28, 1907, P. L. 280, provides: "The lien of a tax or municipal claim shall not be divested, by any judicial sale of the
property liened, as respects so much thereof as the proceeds of such may be insufficient to discharge; nor shall
a judicial sale of the property liened, under a judgment obtained on a tax or municipal claim, discharge the lien of
any other tax or municipal claim than that upon which
such sale is had, except to the extent that the proceeds re-'ized are sufficient for its payment, after paying the costs
and expenses of the sale and of the writ upon which it was
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made, and any other prior tax or municipal claim to which
the fund may first be applicable. On any such sale being
made, all tax claims shall be paid out of the proceeds thereof: first the oldest tax having priority; and mlinicipal
claims shall be paid next, the oldest in point of lien having
priority. Mortgages, ground rents and other charges on,
or estates in, the -property,which were recorded, or created
where recording is not required, before any tax other than
for the current year accrue, or before the actual doing of
the work in front of or upon the particular property for
which the municipal claim is filed, shall not be disturbed
by such sale unless a prior lien is also discharged." Then
follows a more or less involved provision making it possible, it would seem, to have a sale for taxes or municipal claims, where after several sales enough has not been
bid to cover the same, by judicial decree, clear of mortgages, ground rents or other charges on the land not otherwise divested.
Several other exceptions, not statutory, to the rule
that a judicial sale discharges all liens, have been evolved,
as follows: "1st. Where liens are created by last wills
and testaments as permanent provisions for wives and
children; 2nd. Where from the nature of 'the encumbrance it will not readily admit of valuation; and 3d.
Where it is plain from the agreement of the parties that
the encumbrance was intended to run with the land."
Hiester vs. Green, 48 Pa. 96.
In connection with the divestiture of liens, two cardinal principles have been established: First,--the prospective purchaser is chargeable with notice of only what
appears of record at the time of the sale, and, Second,-liens, the existence of which prior to a mortgage will cause
it to be divested by a sheriff's sale, must be such as are
themselves divested by the sale and thrown upon the fund.
(Helfrich vs. Weaver, 61 Pa. 385). There are numerous
illustrations of these principles.
In Eckels vs. Stuart, 212 Pa. 161 ,where there was
first on the record a mortgage, then mechanics liens fol-
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lowed by a mortgage, the purchaser at the sale, who was the
owner of the first mortgage, was not permitted to show,
dehors the record, that the mortgage .was an advance money
mortgage and that work upon the ground -hadbeen started
before money had been advanced upon the mortgage, it
not appearing in the mechanics liens filed when the work
was begun, the court, quoting Sharswood, J. "At a sheriff's sale the same rule must apply equally to all bidders,
the mortgagee as well as others, without regard to what
their private information may be as to facts dehors the
record. This puts them all upon an equal footing, as the
bidder is not bound to look beyond the record, neither has
he any right to affect his relations to others by any such
evidence. The date of the filing of the lien was therefore
conclusive as to all parties." "As between the mechanic's
lien claimant and the mortgagee the facts might be shown
because the mortgagee is affected by the actual state of
things on the ground, but an entirely different case is presented when the question arises between the mortgagee
and the purchaser at the sheriff's sale." Reading vs. Hopson, 90 Pa. 494. The fact that the mechanic's claim contains charges for materials -furnished prior to the date of
the mortgage is not equivalent to notice of the time of the
beginning of the work on the ground, Hilliard vs. Tustin,
172 Pa. 354; Wheelock vs. Harding. 4 Supr. 21. But in
Reynolds vs. 'Miller, 177 Pa. 168, where it appeared in the
mortgage that certain buildings were located upon the premises and mechanics' claims filed subsequent in date to the
mortgage, showing on their face that material and work
were furnished for the buildings prior to the date of the
mortgage, it was held -thata purchaser at sheriff's sale had
a right to assume that the mortgage would be discharged.
In harmony with the rule that the purchaser is bound
by only what the record shows, it was ,held in Saunders v.
Gould, 134 Pa. 445, that if the purchaser, at a sheriff's sale
of land, under a judgment subsequent to a mortgage, does
not know that a judgment prior to the mortgage has
been paid, and the record does not show this fact, the sale
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will divest the mortgage, although the prior judgment had
in fact been paid. And the converse of this was held in
Meigs v. Bunting, 141 Pa. 233, viz., that where a judgment
prior to a mortgage was marked satisfied on the record,
the mortgage was not discharged though the judgment was
not in fact paid.
The most common charge or lien upon land, other than
a mortgage, not divested by a judicial sale is the widow's
dower or a charge upon land in her favor. But where there
is a sale of the land on a judgment immediately following
the charge, the arrears of dower due at the time of sale are
discharged. Davison's Appeal, 95 Pa. 394. Tho where a
mortgage immediately followed the dower charge and the
sale was on a subsequent judgment, it was held -thatthe arWertz's Appeal, 65 Pa. 306.
rears were not discharged.
But, generally, "when the amount of a charge has become
certain; when the event upon which it was to be paid has occurred; when it -is due, it is discharged -by a sheriff's sale."
Levengood's Estate, 38 Supr. 491.
WAIVER OF EXEMPTION. The debtor's exemption has occasioned litigation out of proportion to its size,
and the law's solicitude for the indigent debtor has vacillated from an effort, for his supposed benefit, to permit him
to repudiate his waiver,-the last instance of which appears
in the 31st section of -theAct of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 404,
repealed by the Act of June 19th, 1911, P. L. 1069,-to sus
taining the most ingenious efforts to defeat it, as appears in
Hoerner v. Cordell, 10 Supr. 314. In this case there was
first, a mortgage for $108.75, then a judgment for $83.50,
Had these been the
followed by -a judgment for $50.00.
conditions at the time of sale, the debtor would have been
entitled to the difference between the exemption and
$108.75, the amount of the mortgage, less costs, and, as the
real estate sold for but $300, the two judgments would not
have shared; but the owner of the mortgage, to whom the
judgments had been assigned, was permitted to enter his
judgment bond as the fourth lien, and as it contained a
waiver, it enured to the benefit of the two judgments,-the
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owner of the mortgage having been permitted to agree that
the lien of the judgment acquired on the bond should not
relate back to the date of the mortgage, as is the effect in
such cases as to the land covered by the mortgage,-so that
the debtor got nothing. It is rather consoling that in this
case -therewere two dissenting judges.
After reviewing the cases, Justice Mitchell, in Hallman
v. Hallman, 124 Pa. 347, classified the principles involved
in the following familiar terms: "First, a waiver as to any
lien will enure to the benefit of all prior liens; on the principle that a debtor cannot alter the precedence settled by
law; Secondly, a waiver as to any lien will enure to the benefit of subsequent liens, so far as to compel the waiver-creditor to resort first to the exempted fund; on the principle of
the equity of creditors having one and two funds, respecThirdly, a waiver will not
tively, under their control.
enure to the benefit of subsequent liens, beyond its own
amount; so -that if the waiver-judgment is less than $300,
the balance will go to the debtor claiming his exemption,
and this on the broad ground that men may do what they
will with their own, provided -they do not contravene the
settled rules of law, or impair -the rights of others." The
case illustrates the last rule.
It is to be noted that waiver of exemption does not
change the order or position of the liens, and also, that as
to personal property .the order in which execution issues
fixes the position of the waiver judgment and that only
those claims upon which execution has issued share in the
fund. "There is no reason for striking down the debtor's
exemption in favor of a creditor to whom he has made no
concession and in a case involving no question of distribution." Thomas' Appeal, 69 Pa. 120. To -theinquiring student, the following cases may present interesting problems:
Peterson v. Russell, 9 Supr. 332; Miller v. Getz,
135 Pa. 558; Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. 225; Keetley v.
Campbell, 15 Supr. 415; Beetem v. Getz, 5 Supr. 71.
F. B. SELLERS, Jr.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. SHOEMAKER
Provision of Constitution Regarding Ex Post Facto Laws Considered-Substitution by Law of Electrocution for Hanging Be.
tween Time Murder Was Committed and the Trial
Farrow for defendant.
G. A. Clark for Commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GORSON, J. When the homicide was committed, of which Shoemaker was convicted, the law provides that death should be inflicted
by hanging.
Before the trial, the law provided that electrocution
should be substituted for hanging and Shoemaker was sentenced to
death by electrocution. On this appeal he alleged the act void because ex post facto.
The Constitution of the United Si.tes declares that no bill
of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
An ex post facto law as defined by Chase, J., is:
1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes
such act.
2. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
i was when committed.
3. Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender. Calder and wife v. Bull, 3 Dallas 390.
The plea in this case would come under the third provision of this
definition which states that every law is ex post facto which changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater or different punishment.
It is quite obvious that if the punishment was changed from
imprisonment to death, or the term of imprisonment was changed
for a longer period this would be ex post facto. In this case however the statute changed the punishment from death by hanging
t. death by electrocution. The question then arises, is the change
in the manner of inflicting death such a change in the punishment
As would be considered a greater or different punishment.

250

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

At the time Shoemaker committed the crime the punishment for
murder was death by hanging. This method had been adopted be
cause at the time it was considered quickest and surest and, at the
same time, one which caused the condemned the least amount of
pain. As science and scientific methods have been adopted to an
ircreasing extent in a great number of oux modern institutions its
adoption by the legislature for the execution 4f prisoners is consistent with the present trend. Science has provided a method for
inflicting the death penalty which is considered much more humane
than hanging. Electrocution is corsidered Ps a better means of
tking life not only by the prison authorities and law making bodies
but also by our medical profession. The Pennsylvania legislature is
the latest of a number of states who have replaced their gallows
with electric chairs.
"'We think," says Dwight, J. "that the evidence is clearly in
favor of the conclusion that it is within easy reach. of electrical
science at this day to so generate and apply to the person of the
convict a current of electricity of such known and sufficient force
as certainly to produce instantaneous and therefore painless death."
In affirming the pudg'nent in the court of appeals O'Brien, J.
said, "The determination of the legislature that the use of electricity as an agent for producing death constitutes a more humane
rnethod of executing the judgment of the court in capital cases was
held conclusive." 119 N. Y. 263.
This same authority was cited in re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436,
v'here the same question was at issue. The defense of ex post facto
was not even attempted by the defendant in this case and the court
mnerely stated incidentally that as the crime was committed on
March 29, 1889, and the statute passed. Jan. 1, 1889, the federal
statute upon ex p$ost facto has no application.
In the case of Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, it was held
that a statute passed after the enactment of the crime which added
to the former punishment of death the further punishment of solitary confinement until the time of execution was ex post facto. In
a dissenting opinion Justice Brewer said, "I dissent from the opinion and judgment as above declared. The substantial punishment
by each statute is death by hanging. The difference between the
two as to the manner in which this sentence shall be carried into
execution are trifling. (Then follows a list of differences of which
the main one is that the prisoner shall be in solitary confinement
before execution for a longer period than formerly). Yet on account of these differences a convicted murderer is to escape the
death he deserves and be turned loose on society." Justice Bradley
concurred in this dissent.
Taking into consideration that there was a distinct addition to
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the punishment of death imposed upon the prisoner, there is a strong
presumption that if the punishment was a mere change in method
of execution the court would of have held the statute applicable. In
the states where hanging is still the mode of imposing the death
penalty there are two kinds of gallows. One gallows effects the
death of the prisoner by means of a drop which swings the prisoner
up into the air; the other kind drops the support from beneath his
feet. In some states this latter method has recently displaced the
former. Is there enough difference to warrant a plea of ex post facto, if when the crime is committed the drop is still in use?
Under a statute which in its phnishment for murder did not define the manner of imposing the death sentence, passed after the
commission of the crime, the sentenc of death was upheld by the
court and the prisoner was executed. Lowenberg v. The People, 27
N. Y. 339.
This same doctrine was expounded by Denio, J. in Ratzky
v. The People.
In Hartung v. The People, 22 N. Y. 95, there was added to the
former punishment of hanging the further punishment of one year
at hard labor in the penitentiary, making it inapplicable to this
case.
A statute, which mitigates the punishment for a crime committed before its enactment, is not ex post facto. People v. Hays,

140 N. Y. 484.
Considering the eminent authority cited above we must conclude that a change in punishment from death by hanging to death
by electrocution is a mitigation of the punishment.
In view of these facts, and the fact that the prisoner was duly
tried and convicted, it would be an imposition upon the public for
the court, whose duty it is to interpret the laws for the protection
of the public to do other than affirm the sentence.
Judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court.

COMMONWEALTH v. GANS
Evidence-Capacity of Child to Testify-Act of April 23,. 1909.
P. L. 140
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the trial of Gans for the murder of Mrs. Carey, a son of the
latter who was but five years old at the time of the murder and
was seven at the time of the trial, testified to the identity of Gans
t, the murderer. The court admitted, the witness without interrogation of him to ascertain his intelligence and sense of duty to
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speak the truth. Conviction. This is a motion for a new trial, assigning the act of the court designated above as error.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GRIFFITH, J. The question to be determined by this court is
v hether the court below acted properly in admitting "the witness
without interrogation of him to ascertain his intelligence and sense
of duty to speak the truth" to testify.
The child was aged seven years. No examination was made by
the court touching hs capacity as to intelligence, understanding or
responsibility. By the common law rule every person over the age
of fourteen is presumed to have common discretion and understanding until the contrary appears, but under that age it is not so prestomed, and therefore inquiry is made as to the degree of understanding which the child offered as a witness may possess. If
be appears to have sufficient natural intelligence to distinguish
between good and evil and to comprehend the nature and effect of
an oath he may be examined on oath. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence,
sec. 367. There is no conflict among the authorities as to the necessity of administering an oath, though there is some as to the question of age. Prima facie the child was incompetent and could not
testify. The court might, however, examine him so as to determine his mental and moral capacity and allow him to testify. This
determination is judicial; the examination is a part of the trial,
,_t. must be made in public, and in court. The decision must be founded upon the opinion of the judge from the examination which he
makes, and cannot be referred to somebody else. He must act upon
his own opinion. The testimony of witnesses is to be given under
the sanctity of an oath, and where a child is of such tender years
a. not to be able to comprehend the nature of an oath, the safe
guards which the law has placed around human testimony would
be entirely overthrown were such statements permitted to be given.
People v. Frindel, 65 N. Y. Supreme Court 482. The credit due to
the statements of such a witness is submitted to the consideration
of the jury, who should regard the age, the understanding, and the
sense of the accountability for moral conduct in coming to their
conclusion.
At one time it was considered that an infant under the age of
nine years could not be permitted to testify under any circumstances and that between the age of nine and fourteen years it was
within the discretion of the court to admit or not, as it should or
should not be satisfied of the infant's understanding and moral
sense. Rex v. Dunnel, East's P. C. 442. It was finally determined
in Brazier's case, East's P. C. 443, in consultation with all the
judges, that a child of any age capable of distinguishing between
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good and evil might be examined on oath and this is considered the
established rule in civil and criminal cases. Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 94;
Simpson v. The State, 31 Ind. 30. The admissibility of children as
witnesses depends not merely upon their possessing a competent degree of understanding, but also in part upon their having received
such a degree of religious instruction as not to be ignorant of the
nature of an oath, or f the consequences of falsehood. 1 Philips
on Evidence (4th Am. Ed.), 11 and 12.
If an infant appears on
examination by the court to possess a sufficient sense of the wickedness and. danger of false swearing he may be sworn, although of
ever so tender an age.
The credibility of the witness is to be
judged of by the jury from the manner of the testimony and from
other circumstances. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 10 Mass. 225.
It is not a fact that no child of seven years of age can understand
the nature of an oath. This depends upon the precocity of the
child, the training it has received and its moral perceptions. 1
Greenleaf on Evidence, see. 367. It is not unusual to receive the
testimony of children under nine, and sometimes under seven years
of age, if they appear to be of sufficient understanding; and it has
been admitted even at the age of five. Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 94. The
law fixes no precise age when a witness shall be excluded, and inquiry is made by the court to determine the question suggested, and
ascertain the capacity of the witness, and the admission or the rejection must depend on sound discretion of the judge making the
examination. If the child comprehends the obligations of an oath
and believes that any deviation from 'the truth while under oath
will be followed by appropriate punishment it is competent, although it
is ignorant of the nature of the punishment. Blackwell v. State, 11
Ind. 196; Wade v. State, 50 Ala. 164. The Appellate Court will not
interfere if the trial judge concludes that a.child is competent in
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Washburn v. The People, 10 Mich. 372; West Virginia v. Michael, 19 L. R. A. 605 and
notes. In such case the trial court has a very wide discretion, but
we have not found any case justifying the reception of the unsworn statement of a child of immature years, and the danger of
receiving such a statement from such a source is well illustrated
in the last cases cited: "Not being amenable to the law for the
false swearing, and having no knowledge of moral responsibility, designing and wicked people may easily use them to further intrigues
of their own without fear of punishment for subornation of perjury.
They are as clay in the potters hands, to be moulded some to honor,
and some to dishonor, lacking conscientiousness, they repeat with
phonographic precision the things that have been told to them to
say, be they true or false. Neither reason nor authority justifies
the admission of such witnesses. The effect of an oath upon the
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conscience of a child should arise from religious feelings of a
permanent nature, and not merely from instructions confined to the
nature of an oath recently communicated to him for the purpose of
trial." The judge of 'the trial court had means of decision in this
matter not possessed by us, and while in a great majority of cases
the decision of the trial court in the matter of competency of a
child depending as it does not on age but on intelligence, must be final,
and it must be a very flagrant case of error to authorize the appellate ocurt to reverse the judgment.
Whart. Ev. 386.
Even
when an oath is administered, it is still a matter of discretion which
is reviewable by the appellate court, and the abuse of which is a
reason for a reversal of the judgment.
In all cases the test on which testimony is received in courts
is fhe oath administered to the witness, and whatever its form may
be, the oath is an appeal to God by the witness affirming that
hc will speak the truth on the witness stand. If the witness has no
knowledge of God, or belief in his existence, and shows no sense of
accountability to Him for false testimony there is no guaranty of the
truth of such testimony. The sense of accountability of a witness,
if he be untruthful in giving his testimony, has been universally
recognized as the requisites of competency, and renders unnecessary
an elaborate citation of authority.
1 Greenleaf on Evidence, 365
and 367; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1.
The substantial test of the competency of an infant witness is
his intelligence and comprehension of the obligation of telling the
truth. The truth is what the law, under the rules of evidence is
seeking, and if a full and present understanding of the obligation to
tell it is shown by the witness, the nature of the conception of his
obligation is of secondary importance. Commonwealth v. Furman,
211 Pa. 549.
Here the witness was but five years of age when the crime
was committed and the trial took place two years later. The tendency of the child to forget the circumstances and the fact that
there was an opportunity to prompt the child leads us to believe
that the court should have by all means taken a little more than
ordinary precaution to examine the child.
The court below did not
make any examination touching the witness' "sense of duty to
speak." This we construe as meaning that the child was put through
the form of the oath and not questioned as to whether he understood
the solemnity and reasons for the oath. To the child it could be
no more than a mere matter of form, it was too young -to comprehend the nature of the oath and we think that it should have been
questioned in reference to this. There being no examination made
with respect to the intelligence of the child we are unable to make
any comment upon it but feel that where human life is at stake as
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in this case - murder, that all precautions should have been taken
and all measures used to secure evidence which would be clear of all
doubt. For the law has great deference for human life and not
only should the evidence to convict be free of all suspicion but the
witnesses and modes of securing the evidence should be clear of
doubt and suspicion.
In view of a new trial in which this may be cleared we feel
justified from the foregoing citations and principles that the witness should have been further examined by the court below and we
are constrained to reverse the judgment and grant a new trial.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
One of the most absurd exhibitions made by judge and lawyers was what occurred when a child was offered as a witness, and
it was necessary to determine his competency to take an oath.Every
witness had to be sworn, and the fact that a youthful person had
not the mental qualification to take an oath, required of an ordinary
witness, was decisive against his fitness to be heard. The court however allowed the boy or girl to be instructed as to the existence of
God; the immortality of the soul, the sequence of punishment after
death upon perjury, etc., at the trial, naively supposing that such
instruction could impart the necessary religious basis for reliable
testimony.
This absurdity the act of April 23d, 1909, P. L. 140, has probably
rendered no longer capable of perpetration. Every witness may affirm. "No witness," says the acts, shall be questioned in any judicial
proceeding, coneef ning his religious belief, nor shall any evidence be
heard upon the subject for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility." Under the shelter of this statute even young
witnesses must, we trow, be exempted from prying investigations
into religious beliefs or disbeliefs, or non-beliefs.
A difficulty still remains in the case of infants under 7 years
of age. They are not amenable to the penalties of perjury, and thus
one of the sanctions of adult testimony is withdrawn. We discover
no evidence, however, that this freedom from criminal liability works
an incapacity to testify.
The witness who was allowed to testify was, at time of testimony but 7 years old; and he testified to a fact of which he
became cognizant, when he was but 5 years old.
It does not appear that objection was made to the competency
of the witness by the accused. Nor did the accused ask the court
to strike out the testimony or otherwise indicate, prior to a rendition
of the verdict, his disatisfaction with the submission of the witness'
testimony, to the consideration of the jury.
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The accused, if doubting the intelligence of the witness, might
have required the court to enter on an investigation of it or to permi him to cross-examine the witness for the purpose of manifesting what his intelligence was. He did not do any of those things,
but allowed the jury to deliberate and frame a verdict. Only when
this verdict was adverse, did he complain of the improper reception of telstimony.
The exclusion of a child of seven, simply because of his age can
The
hardly be justified.
Children differ much in intelligence.
capacity to observe and remember must depend somewhat on the
character of the act or circumstance 'that the witness is asked to
describe. Some things a young child might easily notice and recall, while he would not properly observe or remember others.
of. John Stuart Mill it is said that at 3 years of age, he had learned
long lists of Greek words with their English equivalents. Before he
was eight years old, "he had read Aesop's Fables, Xenophon's Anabasus, and the whole of Herodotus and was acquainted with Lucian,
He had
Diogenes Laertius, Isocrates, and six dialogues of Plato.
also read a great deal of History in English-Rbertson's Histories,
Hlume, Gibbon, Robert Watson's Philip II and Philip III, Hooke's
ioman History, part of a translation of Rollin's Ancient History,
Langhornes' Plutorch, Burnet's History of My Own Times, thirty
volumes of the Annual Register, Millar's Historical View of the
English Government, Mosheim's Eceleriastical History, McCrie's
Knox, and two Histories of the Quakers." Vol. XVIII. Encyc. Britannica, p. 454, 11th Edition. What would we think of the arrogant
stupidity of a judge that would have refused to allow this child to
testify on the ground that he was not intellectually qualified?
In Com. v. Furman, 211 Pa. 549, a boy 8 years old testified
against one accused of murder, with- the approval of the trial judge.
Piepke v. Phila. & R. Railway Co., 242 Pa. 321, reverses a non-suit,
occasioned in part by the exclusion of the testimony of a boy
slightly over seven years old, of whose intelligence, of whose memory, of whose sense of obligation to speak the truth, the court
had anade no test.
Although the cout below might have declined to admit the
witness until it had examined him with respect to capacity to give
probably reliable testimony, we cannot say that the admission of
the testimony without preliminary investigation, was reversible error. So far as appears the nature of the testimony delivered may
sufficiently have displayed the intelligence of the witness. Reversed.
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HICKS v. HOOPER
Ejectment-flisputed Boundary Line-Necessity of Knowledge of
Adverse Holding to Acquisition of Land By Prescription
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining farms.
There
was a fence which Hooper believed to be on the true boundary, and
for twenty-one years Hopper was in possession up to this fence. He
would not have claimed the land up to the fence, had he not believed that it belonged to him. The evidence shows that the fence
includes ten acres of land belonging to Hicks. The court told the
jury that I-oppcr's possession was not adverse, if he would not
b.ve retained it had he believed that it included any land belonging
tc. hicks. Verdict for Hicks. Defendant appeals.
Breneman for plaintiff.
Burke for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRUNER, J. In cases of mistake as to the true line between
two adjoining tracts of land, will an intent on part of one owner not
to claim any land not belonging to him, estop such owner from
setting up a claim by adverse possession to a disputed parcel? Hopper, the defendant in the present case, occupied for the statutory
period ten acres of land belonging to the plaintiff, in the belief that
the fence dividing the two tracts was on the true boundary. The
defendant stated, however, that he would not have claimed the land
up to the fence had he not believed that it belonged to him.
An. occupant of land must intend to hold in hostility to the true
owner.
The very foundation of the adverseness of the holder' is
based on the quo animo or intention of the party in possession. Calhoun v. Cook, 9 Pa. 226; Criswell v. Altemus, 7 Watts, 575; Sailor
v. Hertzogg, 2 Pa. 182; Moore v. Collishaw, 10 Pa. 224; Ingersoll v.
Lewis, 11 Pa. 212; Hoopes v. Garver, 15 Pa. 517.
To eliminate the question of intention in cases of adverse possession would have the effect of excluding an essential and indispensable ingredient, and one that is said to be a controlling, vital, and necessary element. 15 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1205; 1 Cyc. 1038, and cases
cited. In cases like the one under consideration, the character of the
holding is not determined merely by the existence of a mistake, but
depends in great measure upon the presence or abuse of the requisite
intention to claim title. The absence of such intention is ever fatal.
In McCullough v. McCall, 10 Watts, 367, it was held that there must
be an intention to claim title to all land within a certain boundary,
whether it eventually be correct or not.
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The declarations of the person in possession are admissible to
show the character of the interest claimed. Miles v. Miles, 8 Wattg &
S. 135; Calhoun v. Cook, 9 Pa. 226; Hall v. Mathias, 4 W. & S. 331;
McCoy v. Trustees of Dickinson College, 5 S. & R. 254; Rung v.
Schoneberger, 2 Watts, 23; Bradford v. Guthrie, 4 Brewster 351; Law
v. Patterson, 1 W. & S. 184. According to the evidence, the defendant disclaimed any intention to hold adversely to Hicks, if it should
turn out that he was occupying any land included in the plaintiff's
tract. An occupant of land cannot claim protection under the statute
in opposition to the expressed intent with which he held possession.
Long v. Mast, 11 Pa. 189; Rung v. Schoneberger, 2 Watts, 23; Scwab
v. Bickel, 11 Super. 317; Bradford v. Guthrie, 4 Brewster, 351. In the
absence of intention to hold adversely, it will be presumed that the
intention was to hold only to the true line. Grove v. McAlevy, (Pa.), 8
Atl. 210; Kuhns v. Fennel, (Pa.), 15 Atl. 920; Rider v. Maul, 46 Pa.
376.
Bradford v. Guthrie, supra, and Comegys v. Carley, 3 Watts, 280,
are two of the leading cases in this state dealing with this question
of intention. In both of these cases it was held that where the occupation of the land was by a mistake, with no intention to hold to the
visible boundary unless that intention should turn out to be the true
one, and with no intention to claim any land belonging to an adjoining owner, the possession was not adverse. In the latter case Gibson, C. J., said: "I do not say that there may not be an adverse possession in the case of an unsettled boundary; on the contrary, I admit that a party may make out an incontestable title under the statute
where the boundary was in dispute; but it is not easy to understand
why a title should be postponed for the supposed laches of the pro.
prietor, and in favor of one who did not profess to hold against it,
when the intrusion was an accident equally unsuspected by both."
Trickett, in his "Law of Limitation in Pennsylvania," pp. 44 and
45, enunciates the same doctrine when he says: "When one of two
contiguous owners recognizes the true line and believes that he is
within it when, in fact, he is over it, this fact being concealed from
observation, his possession will not be deemed adverse. So, if in
mistake of the true line the owner of a tract assumes it to be on his
neighbor's land, and occupies up to it, with the intention not to deprive this neighbor of any land which should turn out to be. really
his, his possession would not be adverse."
Comegys v. Carley, 3
Watts 280; Bradford v. Guthrie, 4 Brewster, 351; Sailor v. Hertzogg, 2 Pa. 182.
Counsel for the defendant cites Stephens v. Leach, 19 Pa. 262;
Reiter v. McJunkin, 8 Supr. 164, and Adamson v. Potts, 4 Pa. 234, in
support of his claim. We fail to see where any of these cases consider the exact point under discussion.
Stephens v. Leach, supra,
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is a case involving the question of continuity of possession; Adamson
v. Potts, Supra, deals with the acquiesence or agreement of two adjoining landowners to a consentable boundary line, and in the present
case there is no evidence of any agreement between Hicks and Hopper, or of any acquiesence by the plaintiff, in the defendant's occupation of the land in dispute. We cannot inject into the case any new
elements, or presume that any such elements are present; but must
confine ourselves to the facts and evidence as they have come to us.
The third case relied on by the defendant is that of Reiter v. McJunkin, 8 Supr. 164, in which it was held that a man is under no obligation to set his fences on the boundary line of his land, and the fact
that he sets them within that line and cultivates only to his -fence,
"gives the adjoining land owner no right to the land fenced out unless by ownership rights exercised for over twenty-one years." Nowhere in the case do we find any statement of what thesb ownership
rights consist of, or of how they are to be established by the person
claiming adversely to the true owner.
It is our opinion that the charge to the jury was eminently fair
to both parties. Relying on the facts and evidence, and the authorities we have cited, we believe that judgment was properly given for
the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The opinion of the learned court below makes an extended decision by us unnecessary.
Hooper would not have retained the possession of the disputed
piece of land, had he believed that it belonged as in fact it did, to
Hicks. We think, in the case of boundaries, this state of mind is inconsistent with the adverseness of the possession.
Perhaps, in other cases, holding possession of land because it is
believed to be one's own, however erroneously, is holding it adversely.
If A has a conveyance which purports to be B's (the owner's)
and which he believes to be B's, his possession thereunder for 21
years, would make a good title, although the deed was in fact a
forgery, and although, had A known that it was a forgery, he would
neither have taken, nor, having taken, have retained possession of the
land.
Affirmed.
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NICHOLSON v. HENDRICKS
Master and Servant-Liability of Owner of Garage for Negligence of
Chauffeur Furnished Owner of Automobile
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hendricks kept a garage for the storage of automobiles belonging to others. He also furnished chauffeurs to those who desired..
Holmes, owning an automobile which he kept in the garage, asked
Hendricks to furnish him a chauffeur and to conduct him to a certain
designated building in the city. The chauffeur selected, while operating the automobile, negligently caused it to strike one Nicholson,
who was crossing the street. Holmes simply sat in the automobile
giving no directions to the chauffeur. Action for twelve hundred dollars for personal injuries.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HESKETT, J. Negligence on the part of the chauffeur is admitted. It is also admitted by both the plaintiff and the defendant that
the relationship of master and servant existed between the chauffeur and Hendricks. That a master is liable for the negligent acts of
his servant within the scope of his employment is well established
White v. Wilkins, 8 Dickinson Law Review, 7.
The only question then is, is there relationship of master and
servant between the chauffeur and Holmes and is it of such a nature
that Holmes is the responsible party? The principal test as to whether
the relation of master and servant exists, is the application of the
following facts: (1) The right of selection; (2) The right of direction;
(3) The right of discharge; (4) In whose business was the servantengaged. 37 L. R. A. 38-Note. -We think the right of Holmes
to select a chauffeur in the present case was clear. Hendricks was
not bound to furnish chauffeurs but when requested to do so merely
undertook to comply, subject to the approval of those desiring the
services. The fact that Holmes did not select the chauffeur in this
case -but requested Hendricks to do so implies only. that Holmes delegated his right of selection to Hendricks and that Hendricks therefore acted as his agent. It is also plain that Holmes while occupying
the car had the entire right to supervise the operation and direction thereof by the chauffeur. Even though the chauffeur had been
instructed by Hendricks to carry Holmes to a designated place.in the
city Holmes' right to select what route would be taken, at what rate
the machine was to be operated or to give any instructions as to
where the car should be stopped or started along the way cannot
Had the chauffeur refused to comply with any of
be doubted.
Holmes' instructions, had he given any, Holmes could have immediate-
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ly dispensed with the chauffeur's service. The chauffeur was also en
gaged in the business of Holmes. Hendricks is the owner of a garage for the storage of automobiles belonging to others and it is no
part of his business to conduct the car of Holmes over the city without accident to others and where he furnishes chauffeurs he is acting
merely in the character of an employment agency. Hendricks was
in no sense pursuing the business of a carrier. We think the facts
when applied to the test, warrant the conclusion that the chauffeur
is the servant of Holmes.
Even though the chauffeur had been lent or leased to Holmes
and remained in the general employ of Hendricks, Holmes is liable
for the torts of the chauffeur while engaged in Holmes' special business.
McInerney v. D. & H. Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 411; Higgins v.
West. Union Tel. Co. 156 N. Y. 75. In Kimball v. Cushman, 103 Mass.
194, it is held. to establish the liability of one person for the negligence of another, it is enough, that at the time of the negligent act,
the guilty party was in charge of defendant's property and by his assent
and authority engaged in his business and in respect to that business
under his control. It will be noted from this that it is not necessary
for the negligent party to be in the general employ of the defendant
nor that he should be under any special engagement of service to
him, or entitled to receive compensation from him directly.
It follows that the plaintiff has sued the wrong party and judg
ment must therefore be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Where the general servant of one person is put temporarily at
the service of another, the question whether the former is responsi-,
ble for the negligence of the servant, is one for the solution of
which the cases furnish no satisfactory test. The conflict in the
authorities is strikingly illustrated by two very recent cases which
resemble closely the present case. See Onelletle v.Superior Motor &
Machine Works, 157 Wis. 531, 147 N. W. 1014. 52 L. R. A. N. S. 299,
Janik v. Lord Motor Car Co. 52 L. R. A. N. S. 294. The general
question is discussed with considerable perspicuity in Huffcutt on
Agency, sec. 228-231. As stated in Janik v. Motor Co. (Mich.), "the essence of the
best considered cases upon the temporary hire of a servant for a special purpose is thus well stated in 26 Cyc. 1522. 'The test is whether in
the particular -which he is engaged or requested to perform, he continues liable to the direction and control of his original master, or
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becomes subject to that of the -person to whom he is hired. It is not
so much the actual exercise of control which is regarded as the
right to exercise such control.'"
Our knowledge of the duties of a chauffeur and the opinion of
the court below lead us in applying the above test, to the conclusion
that the judgment of the learned court below must be affirmed.

BOOK REVIEW
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, 2d Edition. Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, 1915.
It is eleven years since Wigmore's Treatise on Evidence appeared. A supplement thereto was issued four years later. The present
volume is a second edition with very much additional matter. An extended and very interesting preface introduces the text. It is scarcely necessary for us to dilate upon the extraordinary merits of the
original work and of this supplement. The erudition, analytic power,
and pains-taking accuracy of its author are well known on both
sides of the Atlantic, and are indisputable. In our judgment no
other work on evidence is worthy to be compared with the Wigmore treatise. The supplement cannot but be extremely serviceWe most
able, to practitioners and to students of the subject.
heartily commend it.

